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Abstract
We analyse the determinants of long term external debt for a large
sample of developing countries. We ¯nd that, in addition to the stan-
dard economic variables, institutional and socio-political variables are
a key factor in explaining the level of external debt. Overall the re-
sults point to an interpretation based on the presence of binding credit
constraints. Such constraints are relaxed in the presence of high qual-
ity of institutions and low political risk, while they are tightened when
socio-political risk is higher.
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1 Introduction
Access to foreign ¯nancing is of fundamental importance for developing coun-
tries. External resources allow countries with low levels of domestic savings
to accelerate capital accumulation boosting economic growth.1 Moreover, ac-
cess to international capital markets permits consumption smoothing during
periods of temporary shocks and facilitates the engagement in risk-sharing
arrangements. This latter aspect is crucial for developing countries given the
high economic volatility that typically characterises them.
Nonetheless the access to international capital markets has been a mirage
for the majority of developing countries: the literature has extensively docu-
mented their inability to borrow from international markets and, whenever this
occurs, the impossibility to do this at their own preferred terms. As stressed
by Eichengreen et al. (2005) developing countries external debt is generally
short term and denominated in foreign currency, exposing them to a high level
of vulnerability. Several explanations have been put forward to explain this
evidence.
On the one hand the debt intolerance approach (Reinhart et al., 2003)
points to the institutional weaknesses of less developed economies as the cause
of unreliable policies that do not allow them to manage levels of debt that are
instead manageable for advanced economies.
On the other hand the \original sin" hypothesis (Eichengreen and Haus-
mann, 1999; Eichengreen et al., 2005) puts the emphasis on the intrinsic fea-
tures of international ¯nancial markets and on the structure of international
portfolios characterised by an extensive use of few currencies (due to increasing
returns in currency holdings) that systematically discriminate against emerg-
ing market currencies.2
The original sin hypothesis is related also to a vast literature that has
explored the lack of integration observed in international capital markets as
caused by the di±cult contract enforceability in an international setting.3 It is
well known in fact that the unavailability of a regulatory framework that allows
contract enforcement with sovereign debtors changes radically the relationship
between lenders and borrowers who, in addition to the usual \ability to pay"
arguments, must consider also \willingness to pay" arguments. This inevitably
1See Lucas (1990).
2This literature does not neglect the role played by domestic factors in determining the
di±cult access to external ¯nance by developing countries, however it stresses that these
are secondary e®ects as compared to the discrimination operated by international ¯nancial
markets.
3See, among others, Bulow and Rogo® (1989), Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and Kletzer
(1994).3
widens the concept of creditworthiness from the standard economic elements
to institutional and political aspects that can a®ect the decision to pay (or
default) of a sovereign debtor. Moreover these imperfections are further exac-
erbated by the possibility of moral hazard by the debtor country that, aware
of its limited liability, might use the proceeds of its borrowing to increase con-
sumption or invest in improper projects wasting the growth-potential of debt.
All the arguments outlined above point to an international ¯nancial mar-
ket that, when faced with the problem of lending to developing countries, is
plagued by severe imperfections that lead to credit rationing. As Eaton and
Gersowitz (1981) put it \foreign lenders do establish a credit ceiling above
which they will be unwilling to increase loans".
In this paper we build on the literature described above to analyse em-
pirically the determinants of the stock of external debt for a large set of de-
veloping countries. In particular, in addition to economic elements, we focus
on the role played by institutions and socio-political factors in in°uencing a
country's debt-ceiling. We believe that these factors, shaping the framework
within which policymakers make their decisions, are a key element in the de-
termination of creditworthiness, particularly for developing countries.
Surprisingly the literature has concentrated mainly on the possible negative
consequences of (high) level of external debt, i.e. on debt default,4 neglecting
the factors that a®ect the general level of debt and the constraints posed by
international ¯nancial markets on developing countries. This contribution tries
to ¯ll this gap and in particular ours is among the few papers that thoroughly
investigate the role of political factors in determining the stock of external
debt.5
Overall the results point to an interpretation based on the existence of bind-
ing credit constraints for developing countries. Such constraints are relaxed in
the presence of high quality of institutions and low political risk, while they are
tightened by higher socio-political risk. These results are robust to the chosen
speci¯cation and to the estimation methodology. We also ¯nd that the debt
constraint is relaxed for richer and more open economies, and in the presence
of a higher level of education, deeper ¯nancial system, and °exible exchange
rate regime.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the
theoretical framework underlying the empirical model, section 3 presents the
data set, the variables used, and the methodology applied, section 4 presents
the results, ¯nally section 5 concludes.
4See among the most recent contributions Manasse and Roubini (2009), Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2009), Arteta and Hale (2008), and the survey by Panizza et al. (2009).
5Exceptions are Ozler and Tabellini (1991) and Lane (2004) although in the latter the
treatment of institutional and political factors is rather super¯cial.4
2 Theoretical framework
In order to formalise our approach we build on the work by Lane (1999, 2004),
Gertler and Rogo® (1990) and Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996)6 in assuming that
imperfections in international ¯nancial markets (due to moral hazard, repudi-
ation risk, etc.), ration developing countries' access to external ¯nance. The
working assumption is therefore that there is a ceiling on the level of debt that
a borrowing (developing) country can take.
Dit · D
max
it = µitYit (1)
As stated in equation (1) the debt ceiling is increasing in the level of out-
put: the greater the level of output the higher is the amount of collateral the
borrowing country can put up against the debt (alternatively the greater the
level of output the greater the damage that can be imposed on the country).7
Empirically the parameter of interest is µ which captures additional factors,
other than income level, that a®ect the debt ceiling.
We allow µ to vary over time and across countries and we model it as de-
pending on the level of the country productivity, the degree of creditworthiness
and external factors (shocks).
µit = µ(Ait;CEit;CPit;´t) (2)
where Ait identify productivity, CEit and CPit creditworthiness. Among
the factors that a®ect creditworthiness we distinguish between economic as-
pects CE and institutional and socio-political factors CP. Finally ´t identi¯es
all (time speci¯c) external shocks such as shocks to the world interest rate or
a contraction in global demand due to a recession in industrialised countries.
Linearising the function above we obtain the following testable equation:
D
max






3XCPit + ´t + ²it (3)
Where yit is log output, XAit, XCEit, XCPit denote respectively the vec-
tors of variables representing productivity and creditworthiness, ´t denotes a
common time varying shock and ²it the error term.
6In particular chapter 6.
7Equation (1) could be modi¯ed in order to allow a non linear relationship between the
debt ceiling and the level of output.5
3 Data and methods
3.1 Sources
Our empirical investigation is based on a data set for a large number of devel-
oping countries over the period 1970-2000. Table 5 and table 6 in the Appendix
provide the list of countries included in the analysis and some descriptive sta-
tistics of the variables. Since we are not interested in short term or cyclical
e®ects we use ¯ve-year averages. Economic data are taken from the World
Bank World Development Indicators data set. Political and socio-political
variables come from di®erent sources such as the Database of Political Institu-
tions (DPI), the Cross National Time Series archive and the Polcon variable
provided by Henisz (2002). The full list of sources is reported in the Appendix.
Our dependent variable is the log of total long term per-capita external debt
in constant US$.
In the following sub-section we describe the set of variables included in our
empirical model that a®ect the country productivity and creditworthiness as
outlined in equation (3).
3.2 Explanatory variables
For the sake of clarity we will classify the explanatory variables according to the
theoretical framework outlined in the previous section. Our interpretation and
discussion is centred on the punishment or premium mechanisms explaining
the debt ceiling imposed on developing countries by foreign investors. We work
under the assumption that the credit constraint de¯ned in equation (3) is bind-
ing and that developing countries operate at their debt ceiling (Dit = Dmax
it ).
It could be argued that assuming a binding credit constraint on developing
countries' debt is a strong assumption. Our answer is based on three con-
siderations. First there is ample anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon as
reported for instance by Eichengreen et al. (2005). Second there is no no per-
suasive econometric procedure that allows to relax the borrowing constraint
for some countries.8 Finally the assumption that developing countries are sub-
ject to a binding credit constraint is shared by the major part of the literature
both theoretical and empirical.
The ¯rst variable that we consider is the:
8The only paper that tries to deal with this issue is Eaton and Gersowitz (1981). Notwith-
standing some theoretical problems (in their model a country with a higher growth potential
should face a lower debt ceiling which is not found in the data), they ¯nd that the vast ma-
jority of the countries in their sample is indeed credit constrained.6
(i) Level of development. We represent it with the log of GDP per-capita in
constant US$. As stated above a higher level of output on the one hand
represents a good proxy for the ability of a country to provide its foreign
lenders with a collateral, on the other hand it is directly correlated with
the measure of the punishment that lenders can in°ict to the country in
case of default. Therefore we expect a positive sign for the coe±cient of
this variable.
Regarding variables representing a country productivity we consider the
following:
(ii) Human capital. As a proxy of human capital we use the average years
of higher schooling in the total population (Educ). As shown by the
literature on economic growth, education represents a strongly growth-
enhancing factor, particularly in developing countries. Thus, we expect
that higher future growth prospects incorporated in a higher level of
education could reduce a developing country's credit constraint.
(iii) Trade openness. Openness to international trade is measured by the ra-
tio of exports over GDP. It is well known that trade openness is one of
the factors that are more robustly correlated with growth. However in
our setting other factors may a®ect the relationship between trade and
external debt. More open economies should have a higher cost in repudi-
ating their external debt obligations. This happens not only because of
trade sanctions imposed by lenders but mainly because of the disruption
of trade °ows that generally follows default. Moreover a higher level of
trade guarantees the availability of foreign currency that is crucial for the
repayment of external debt. Therefore, not only trade openness fosters
a country growth's prospects, but we can also consider traded goods as
a sort of collateral which increases the creditworthiness of a country. In
both cases we expect economies characterised by higher levels of trade
volume to have higher level of external debt.
Regarding other economic factors that a®ect a country's creditworthiness
we consider the following:
(iv) Financial development. We proxy it by the level of the domestic credit
provided by the banking sector as share of GDP (Findepth). On the
one hand, more developed ¯nancial markets should be characterised by
a more e±cient use of funds that could be associated with better growth
prospects; on the other hand ¯nancial development may also be a proxy
for a discipline-e®ect which could reduce the willingness to borrow from7
external sources in order not to worsen internal ¯nancial vulnerability
and instability.9
(v) Exchange rate regime. We use a measure of the de-facto exchange rate
regime classi¯cation by Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) . A higher value of
the variable (Excharr) denotes a more °exible exchange rate regime.10
We expect countries characterised by more °exible exchange rate regimes
to be less vulnerable to currency crises that could trigger debt defaults.
This should have a positive impact on the level of external debt.
(vi) Involvement with international ¯nancial institutions. Given our emphasis
on developing countries we cannot ignore the fact that several countries
have special access to external ¯nancing, either under the form of direct
help from multilateral institutions, or via funds accessible at cheaper
terms with respect to market conditions. We use two variables to cap-
ture these e®ects. First, aid per capita which includes both o±cial de-
velopment assistance (ODA) and o±cial aid (Aidpc). Second, we use
the share of concessional debt on total long term external debt (Conc).11
Both factors might have a relaxing e®ect on the debt ceiling faced by de-
veloping countries. This is so because the existence of a relationship be-
tween borrowing countries and multilateral ¯nancial institutions reduces
informational asymmetries that would be otherwise present in a market
environment. Moreover, the possible dependance on foreign aid and the
high cost of losing this ¯nancial resource in case of default, provides an
additional punishment tool in the hands of the external creditors.
Turning to institutional factors we consider three dimensions of a country's
political framework that could a®ect its creditworthiness: the degree of political
stability, the transparency of the political process and the presence of checks
and balances in the decision making process.12
9From the discussion above it is clear that trade openness and ¯nancial development
could be interpreted as a®ecting both a country's productivity and its creditworthiness.
Our interpretation is that the openness e®ect operates mainly through the productivity
channel while ¯nancial depth operates mainly through the creditworthiness channel.
10This variables assigns values ranging from 1 to 4 to classify exchange rate regimes from
pegged to °exible. Technically given that we already control for the e®ect of spells of high
in°ation we assign to freely falling regimes the same value (4) as free °oaters. This procedure
does not e®ect the results.
11According to the de¯nition in the GDF database provided by the World Bank, conces-
sional debt is de¯ned as loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or more.
12We have also explored other dimensions of the political space such as measures of the
political system (presidential vs parliamentary) and measure of the ideological location of
the government. It turns out that these variables are never signi¯cant and in addition imply
the loss of several observations. Therefore, we have not included them in the analysis8
(vii) Political stability. We proxy it with the government Her¯ndahl index
(Herfgov). Lower values of the index capture a more fragmented gov-
ernment coalition.13 A less fragmented political environment (associated
with a lower risk of expropriation perceived by the international lenders)
is generally considered as a desirable feature from the international ¯nan-
cial community. Therefore, we predict countries characterised by higher
levels of political stability to have a slacker credit constraint relative to
countries with an unstable political environment.
(viii) Transparency of the political process. This dimension of the political
environment is captured through a measure of electoral openness and
political competitiveness (Liec). This variable quanti¯es the electoral
competitiveness based on the number of parties competing in the last
election (higher values of the variable are associated with more open
electoral systems).
(ix) Checks and balances. This feature of the political system is captured by
a measure of political constraint on the executive based on the num-
ber of veto players in the policy decision process. Taken from Henisz
(2002), the index (Polcon) uses information on the number of indepen-
dent branches of government (including executive, lower and upper leg-
islative chambers) with veto power over policy change, the degree of
alignment across branches of government based on party composition of
each branch, and the degree of preference heterogeneity within each leg-
islative branch. Thus, it combines information both on the quality of the
decision process and on the ability of the executive to commit to its past
policy decisions. We expect that countries with a higher level of checks
and balances (higher values of Polcon) will also be able to obtain greater
credit from their lending counterparts.
(x) Social instability. We complement the set of institutional variables with
the measures Assass and Purges which represent the number of political
assassinations and purges respectively. The inclusion of these two vari-
ables is motivated by the consideration that a stable environment from
the social-political point of view represents a characteristic which can
improve a country's rating by reducing the risk of expropriation faced by
international lenders, improving a country's overall creditworthiness.
In order to control for cross-country heterogeneity we include two regional
13The Her¯ndahl index government is calculated as the sum of the squared seat shares of
all parties in the government. Alternative measures such as the degree of fractionalisation
in the government yield similar results9
dummy variables one for Africa and Latin America. We also control for the
existence of structural di®erences between countries that joined the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative jointly run by the World Bank and
the IMF (Dhipc), and for periods of high in°ation (greater than 40)%14 with a
dummy. Finally, we include time dummies in order to control for the existence
of time-related shocks such as changes in the world interest rates and in capital
market conditions (´t in equation (3) above).
3.3 Methodology
We estimate equation (3) by pooled OLS. This choice is motivated by the fact
that our set of of explanatory variables captures the major part of individ-
ual country heterogeneity. An alternative could be represented by the ¯xed
e®ect estimator, able to fully control for cross-country heterogeneity. Such
an estimator is however of limited use in the presence of variables that dis-
play scarce variability over time, which is a general feature of political and
institutional variables. Reported standard errors are robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
In section 4.1 we conduct several robustness checks to our methodology
using a pooled IV, a ¯xed e®ects and a GMM estimator obtaining results in
line with our baseline speci¯cation.
In order to control for possible endogeneity, the level of GDP per capita
and the degree of openness are measured at the beginning of each of the 5
years sample period.15
4 Results
Table 1 reports the results. Column 1 starts by analysing only economic con-
trols. External debt is positively correlated with the level of economic de-
velopment, the degree of openness and the level of education. These results
are consistent with the credit constraint framework: a richer and more open
economy is more vulnerable to the threat of sanctions and, ceteris paribus, is
allowed to take on more debt.
Similarly, a higher level of education, signalling future growth prospects,
allows a relaxation of the credit constraint. External debt is also higher in
14This is the standard World Bank de¯nition of high in°ation. For theoretical and em-
pirical underpinnings of this threshold see Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) and Bruno and
Easterly (1998).
15In section 4.1 we provide IV estimates where GDP is instrumented with the latitude of
the nation's capital.10
countries that have more °exible exchange rate regimes: such regimes are in
fact less vulnerable to currency crises that could trigger a debt default.
The positive and highly signi¯cant coe±cient displayed by Findepth shows
that the e±ciency e®ect prevails over the discipline e®ect of ¯nancial markets.
A country's involvement with multilateral institutions (share of debt lent at
concessional term and the amount of aid per capita) seems to provide a positive
signal allowing a relaxation of the credit constraint. Finally the dummy for
high in°ation displays a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient.16
Columns 2 to 6 progressively include political and institutional controls.
A higher degree of institutional quality allows developing countries to take on
more debt. External debt is in fact higher in countries where the electoral
system is open and competitive (variable Liec) and where political instabil-
ity is lower (higher concentration of government seats). By the same token,
socio-political instability, captured by the variables Assass and Purges, has a
negative e®ect on a country's rating, making the credit constraint more bind-
ing.
Finally Polcon, despite being not statistically signi¯cant, does not quite ¯t
with the credit constraint story outlined so far. In fact, the presence of stronger
checks and balances is generally interpreted by the literature as a measure of
higher institutional quality and, as such it should display a positive coe±cient.
However, an alternative interpretation stresses that high constraints on the
executive could also reduce the e®ectiveness of the policies implemented and
result in a higher degree of political uncertainty. A possible key to disentangle
these two e®ects is provided by the variable Liec: it is likely that the way in
which debt is related to political constraints depends on the transparency of the
political process itself. Therefore, in column 7, we interacted Polcon with Liec
(variable Liecpol): now the interaction term displays a negative coe±cient,
Liec remains positive while Polcon turns from negative to positive and gains
signi¯cance. Therefore we o®er the following interpretation: when the political
process is opaque (low values of Liec) executive constraints provide a measure
of institutional quality as they can prevent excessive power in the hands of
the executive (hence a positive sign on Polcon). On the other hand, when
the political process is already transparent and competitive, the presence of
executive constraints can signal greater political uncertainty on policy decisions
outcomes, resulting in a negative sign for Polcon.
16This result seems in contrast with the credit constraint story; a possible explanation
is that several developing countries increased their debt levels during phases of in°ation




The results presented in the previous section have been subjected to several
robustness checks. In particular, we test the validity of our results obtained
through the pooled OLS estimator by comparing them with those obtained
using di®erent estimation methods which address speci¯c empirical issues. Re-
sults are reported in table 2.
The ¯rst element we consider is the possible endogeneity of the level of GDP
per capita. So far we have dealt with this problem by considering Gdppc as
predetermined taking its value at the begin of each subperiod. In column 1 of
table 2 we treat Gdppc as fully endogenous instrumenting it with the latitude
of the nation's capital (Hall and Jones, 1999). The estimated coe±cients, for
sign and magnitude, are in line with those reported in column 7 of table 1.
In column 2 we report estimates obtained with a panel ¯xed e®ect estima-
tor. Despite its disadvantages with variables that are either ¯xed or display
limited time variability, ¯xed e®ects allow to fully control for cross-country un-
observed heterogeneity. While the sign of the coe±cients are all con¯rmed, not
surprisingly we ¯nd that some variables that display limited time variability
over time lose statistical signi¯cance.
Finally we also consider the dynamic system GMM estimator. Given our
focus on the stock of long run debt and the use of ¯ve year averages the use of
such an estimator is not entirely appropriate, however it allows us to take into
account the persistence of the stock of external debt including (and properly
instrumenting) the lagged dependent variable as regressor. Column 3 reports
the results using the \system GMM" estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In
addition to the positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on the lagged value of debt
all the results presented above are con¯rmed.17
4.1.2 Parameter heterogeneity
Parameters heterogeneity is a typical shortcoming of regression analysis based
on large samples of countries. In particular, our sample consists of countries
that di®er in many structural dimensions such as, for instance, size and the
stage of economic development. Despite controlling for a large set of institu-
tional and economic dimensions, there is always the possibility that results are
driven by some structural aspect not accounted for. We therefore re-estimate
17As customary with GMM estimators we perform the test for autocorrelation in the
disturbance term and the Sargan test for instrument validity. We reject the null of no
correlation of order one but we cannot reject the null of no correlations of second order
autocorrelation. The Sargan-Hansen test con¯rms instrument validity.12
the system on sub-samples divided on the basis of per-capita GDP (as a proxy
for the stage of economic development) and population (as a proxy for the size
of a country). In table 3 we progressively exclude from the regression the 5, 10
and 15 poorest countries (columns 1 to 3); subsequently we progressively ex-
clude the 5, 10 and 15 richest countries (columns 4 to 6) of the sample. Finally
in the last column we have excluded the 5 poorest and 5 richest countries. The
results of the baseline regression appear remarkably robust both in terms of
signi¯cance and also in terms of coe±cient stability. In table 4 we repeated
the exercise excluding countries according to the population size. Again results
appear very robust.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an analysis of the determinants of long-term external debt
for a large sample of developing countries, focussing in particular on the role
played by economic, institutional and socio-political factors. We ¯nd support
for the theories that emphasise that developing countries are constrained in
their access to external ¯nance. In line with many models of international
credit rationing, there exists a strong and positive association between the
level of external debt, the level of output and the degree of trade openness.
Thus, the potential loss in output or the costs due to the disruption of trade it
would incur in case of non repayment, have a positive e®ect on the debt ceiling.
We also ¯nd evidence of a positive e®ect of education, depth of the domestic
¯nancial system, and exchange rate °exibility on external debt. Regarding in-
stitutional and socio-political factors our results show that they have a strong
in°uence on the level of external debt. We ¯nd that higher transparency of the
electoral system, and higher political stability are rewarded by international ¯-
nancial markets. In fact a sound institutional and political environment lowers
the credit risk associated to a country also by decreasing the risk of expropri-
ation so that countries characterised by these two features are allowed to take
on more debt. On the contrary, the binding credit constraint faced by develop-
ing countries is tightened as the socio-political risk perceived by international
lenders increases.13
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Educ 0.958¤¤¤ 1.120¤¤¤ 1.215¤¤¤ 1.213¤¤¤ 1.148¤¤¤ 1.102¤¤¤ 1.213¤¤¤
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
Excharr 0.122¤¤¤ 0.102¤¤¤ 0.090¤¤¤ 0.089¤¤¤ 0.092¤¤¤ 0.085¤¤¤ 0.078¤¤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Findepth 0.477¤¤¤ 0.470¤¤¤ 0.345¤¤¤ 0.342¤¤¤ 0.328¤¤¤ 0.348¤¤¤ 0.358¤¤¤
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Conc 0.029 0.229 0.239 0.226 0.211 0.175 0.185
(0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26)
Aidpc 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Din°a 0.134¤ 0.166¤ 0.227¤¤ 0.237¤¤ 0.218¤¤ 0.207¤¤ 0.230¤¤
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Liec 0.038¤ 0.052¤¤ 0.066¤¤¤ 0.068¤¤¤ 0.052¤¤ 0.071¤¤¤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Herfgov 0.411¤¤¤ 0.377¤¤ 0.366¤¤ 0.411¤¤¤ 0.368¤¤
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Polcon -0.191 -0.221 -0.229 2.309¤¤
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (1.09)
Liecpol -0.383¤¤
(0.16)




Dhipc 0.097 0.187¤ 0.288¤¤¤ 0.282¤¤¤ 0.269¤¤¤ 0.256¤¤ 0.255¤¤¤
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Dafrica 0.418¤¤¤ 0.485¤¤¤ 0.494¤¤¤ 0.489¤¤¤ 0.469¤¤¤ 0.422¤¤¤ 0.434¤¤¤
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Damerica 0.483¤¤¤ 0.438¤¤¤ 0.301¤¤¤ 0.306¤¤¤ 0.332¤¤¤ 0.335¤¤¤ 0.357¤¤¤
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Cons -1.107¤¤ -1.026 -1.842¤¤¤ -1.853¤¤¤ -1.791¤¤¤ -1.537¤¤ -1.584¤¤
(0.55) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.64) (0.63) (0.63)
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86
No. of Obs. 322 275 249 249 249 249 249
Note: Dependent variable is (log) external debt per capita, 5 years averages. Estimation is
Pooled OLS, with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,* denote
signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies included but not
reported.17




Gdppc 0.537¤¤¤ 1.260¤¤¤ 0.141¤¤
(0.13) (0.21) (0.07)
Open 1.390¤¤¤ 0.804¤ 0.707¤¤¤
(0.26) (0.47) (0.11)
Educ 1.502¤¤¤ 1.223¤¤ 0.571¤¤¤
(0.29) (0.56) (0.19)
Excharr 0.079¤¤¤ 0.198¤¤¤ 0.012
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Findepth 0.356¤¤¤ 0.492¤¤¤ 0.256¤¤¤
(0.10) (0.10) (0.05)
Conc -0.375 0.494 -0.274¤
(0.30) (0.44) (0.15)
Aidpc 0.004¤¤¤ 0.002 0.002¤¤¤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Liec 0.074¤¤¤ 0.104¤¤¤ 0.046¤¤¤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Herfgov 0.391¤¤¤ 0.343¤¤ 0.205¤¤
(0.15) (0.16) (0.08)
Polcon 2.585¤¤ 2.613¤¤¤ 1.038¤¤
(1.15) (0.73) (0.47)
Liecpol -0.416¤¤ -0.410¤¤¤ -0.202¤¤¤
(0.17) (0.12) (0.07)
Assass -0.049¤ -0.021 -0.035¤¤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Purges -0.760¤¤¤ -0.126 -0.412¤¤¤
(0.28) (0.23) (0.13)
Din°a 0.235¤¤ 0.013 0.232¤¤¤
(0.10) (0.12) (0.05)
Dhipc 0.187¤¤ . -0.162
(0.09) . (0.12)
Dafrica 0.405¤¤¤ . 0.026
(0.12) . (0.06)
Damerica 0.524¤¤¤ . 0.172¤¤
(0.13) . (0.08)
Cons 0.493 -4.648¤¤¤ 1.562¤¤¤
(0.92) (1.54) (0.46)
R-squared 0.85 0.53
No. of Obs. 249 249 245
Note: Dependent variable is (log) external debt per capita, 5 years averages. Col. 1
reports a IV estimator where Gdppc has been instrumented with the latitude of a nation's
capital. Col 2 and 3 use a ¯xed e®ect estimator and a GMM system estimator. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels respectively. Time dummies included but not reported.18
Table 3: Robustness Checks: Income Categories
Poor 5 Poor 10 Poor 15 Rich 5 Rich 10 Rich 15 Poor-Rich 5
Gdppc 0.825¤¤¤ 0.829¤¤¤ 0.846¤¤¤ 0.784¤¤¤ 0.792¤¤¤ 0.715¤¤¤ 0.750¤¤¤
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Open 1.327¤¤¤ 1.244¤¤¤ 1.220¤¤¤ 1.425¤¤¤ 1.571¤¤¤ 1.948¤¤¤ 1.486¤¤¤
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.31) (0.35) (0.28)
Educ 1.194¤¤¤ 1.294¤¤¤ 1.395¤¤¤ 1.249¤¤¤ 1.480¤¤¤ 1.729¤¤¤ 1.224¤¤¤
(0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.36) (0.27)
Excharr 0.095¤¤¤ 0.111¤¤ 0.095¤¤ 0.091¤¤¤ 0.090¤¤¤ 0.090¤¤¤ 0.110¤¤¤
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Findepth 0.331¤¤¤ 0.362¤¤¤ 0.356¤¤¤ 0.334¤¤¤ 0.404¤¤¤ 0.488¤¤¤ 0.340¤¤¤
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Conc 0.186 0.228 0.016 0.228 0.184 0.205 0.221
(0.30) (0.33) (0.35) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.31)
Aidpc 0.004¤¤¤ 0.003¤¤¤ 0.003¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.003¤¤¤ 0.002¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Din°a 0.198¤¤ 0.182 0.190¤ 0.256¤¤ 0.267¤¤¤ 0.165 0.222¤¤
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Liec 0.068¤¤ 0.063¤ 0.077¤¤ 0.087¤¤¤ 0.091¤¤¤ 0.108¤¤¤ 0.073¤¤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Herfgov 0.203 0.258 0.234 0.340¤¤ 0.279 0.074 0.142
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17)
Polcon 2.840¤¤ 3.126¤¤ 3.011¤ 2.941¤¤ 2.893¤¤ 1.898¤ 2.830¤¤
(1.34) (1.55) (1.62) (1.13) (1.15) (1.07) (1.37)
Liecpol -0.459¤¤ -0.492¤¤ -0.484¤¤ -0.473¤¤¤ -0.476¤¤¤ -0.351¤¤ -0.466¤¤
(0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20)
Assass -0.056¤¤ -0.050¤¤ -0.051¤¤ -0.041 -0.038 -0.027 -0.044¤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Purges -0.750¤¤¤ -0.746¤¤¤ -0.492 -0.577¤¤ -0.525¤¤ -0.472¤¤ -0.723¤¤¤
(0.24) (0.27) (0.31) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.26)
Dhipc 0.250¤¤ 0.289¤¤ 0.442¤¤¤ 0.219¤¤ 0.285¤¤¤ 0.297¤¤¤ 0.220¤
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Dafrica 0.389¤¤¤ 0.365¤¤¤ 0.272¤ 0.464¤¤¤ 0.524¤¤¤ 0.641¤¤¤ 0.397¤¤¤
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
Damerica 0.345¤¤¤ 0.316¤¤¤ 0.267¤¤ 0.374¤¤¤ 0.385¤¤¤ 0.426¤¤¤ 0.381¤¤¤
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
Cons -1.399¤¤ -1.556¤ -1.818¤¤ -1.798¤¤¤ -1.926¤¤¤ -1.565¤¤ -0.987
(0.68) (0.82) (0.71) (0.65) (0.64) (0.71) (0.76)
R-squared 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.82
No. of Obs. 223 203 181 219 203 179 200
Note: Dependent variable is (log) external debt per capita, 5 years averages. Estimation is
Pooled OLS, with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,* denote
signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies included but not
reported. Cols. 1-3 exclude the 5, 10, 15 poorest countries respectively, cols. 4-6 exclude
the 5, 10, 15 richest countries respectively. Col. 7 excludes the 5 richest and the 5 poorest
countries.19
Table 4: Robustness Checks: Population Categories
Small 5 Small 10 Small 15 Large 5 Large 10 Large 15 Small-Large 5
Gdppc 0.834¤¤¤ 0.847¤¤¤ 0.967¤¤¤ 0.784¤¤¤ 0.760¤¤¤ 0.783¤¤¤ 0.772¤¤¤
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Open 1.789¤¤¤ 1.827¤¤¤ 2.034¤¤¤ 1.266¤¤¤ 1.101¤¤¤ 1.007¤¤¤ 1.740¤¤¤
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.39)
Educ 1.379¤¤¤ 1.484¤¤¤ 1.489¤¤¤ 1.336¤¤¤ 0.851¤¤¤ 0.975¤¤¤ 1.635¤¤¤
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.30)
Excharr 0.071¤ 0.041 0.074¤ 0.088¤¤¤ 0.080¤¤ 0.101¤¤¤ 0.082¤¤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Findepth 0.295 0.222 -0.243 0.375¤¤¤ 0.349¤¤ 0.476¤¤¤ 0.372¤
(0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.22)
Conc 0.277 0.272 0.640¤¤ 0.177 -0.280 -0.260 0.290
(0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29)
Aidpc 0.003¤¤¤ 0.006¤¤ 0.003 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤ 0.004¤¤¤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Din°a 0.272¤¤¤ 0.333¤¤¤ 0.245¤¤ 0.281¤¤¤ 0.229¤¤ 0.179¤ 0.333¤¤¤
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
Liec 0.107¤¤¤ 0.102¤¤¤ 0.100¤¤¤ 0.060¤¤ 0.046 0.043 0.088¤¤¤
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Herfgov 0.278¤ 0.208 0.246 0.360¤¤ 0.477¤¤¤ 0.486¤¤¤ 0.289¤
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Polcon 2.810¤¤ 2.582¤¤ 2.514¤ 2.694¤¤ 2.914¤¤¤ 2.595¤¤¤ 2.784¤¤
(1.08) (1.21) (1.36) (1.15) (0.91) (0.95) (1.10)
Liecpol -0.457¤¤¤ -0.442¤¤ -0.418¤¤ -0.404¤¤ -0.457¤¤¤ -0.401¤¤¤ -0.417¤¤
(0.16) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Assass -0.048¤¤ -0.057¤¤ -0.069¤¤¤ -0.047¤ -0.071¤¤¤ -0.067¤¤ -0.029
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Purges -0.516¤¤ -0.528¤¤ -0.277 -0.273 -0.138 -0.116 -0.244
(0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24)
Dhipc 0.256¤¤ 0.166 0.059 0.231¤¤ 0.247¤¤ 0.331¤¤¤ 0.277¤¤
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Dafrica 0.517¤¤¤ 0.434¤¤¤ 0.512¤¤¤ 0.480¤¤¤ 0.246 0.364¤¤¤ 0.585¤¤¤
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16)
Damerica 0.344¤¤¤ 0.290¤¤ 0.127 0.364¤¤¤ 0.287¤¤¤ 0.300¤¤¤ 0.361¤¤¤
(0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Cons -2.195¤¤¤ -2.113¤¤¤ -2.579¤¤¤ -1.377¤¤ -0.584 -0.936 -1.731¤¤¤
(0.62) (0.66) (0.68) (0.64) (0.68) (0.64) (0.66)
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.85
No. of Obs. 220 198 176 215 191 174 193
Note: Dependent variable is (log) external debt per capita, 5 years averages. Estimation is
Pooled OLS, with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,* denote
signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies included but not
reported. Cols. 1-3 exclude the 5, 10, 15 smallest countries respectively, cols. 4-6 exclude
the 5, 10, 15 largest countries respectively. Col. 7 excludes the 5 smallest and the 5 largest
countries.20
Table 5: List of countries.
Algeria Guyana * Panama
Argentina Haiti Paraguay
Benin * Honduras Peru
Bolivia * Hungary Philippines
Botswana India Poland
Brazil Indonesia Senegal *
Burundi Iran, I.R. of South Africa
Cameroon * Jamaica Sri Lanka
Central African Republic Jordan Syrian Arab Republic
Chile Kenya * Thailand
China Lesotho Togo *
Colombia Malawi * Tunisia
Congo, Republic of Malaysia Turkey
Costa Rica Mali * Turkmenistan
Dominican Republic Mauritania Uganda *
Ecuador Mauritius Uruguay
Egypt Mexico Venezuela
El Salvador Nepal Zambia *
Gambia, The * Nicaragua Zimbabwe
Ghana * Niger *
Guatemala Pakistan
Note: (*) indicates HIPC countries.21
Table 6: Descriptive statistics: all countries.
Var. Mean SD. Dev Min 25 50 75 Max N.Obs.
Aidpc 0.47 0.63 0.00 0.09 0.24 0.56 4.27 687
Conc 0.42 0.29 0.00 0.15 0.37 0.66 1.00 662
Excharr 2.18 1.07 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 511
Findepth 0.40 0.29 0.00 0.21 0.34 0.51 2.80 594
Open 0.29 0.18 0.01 0.15 0.25 0.41 1.01 606
Herfgov 0.86 0.25 0.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 545
Educ 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.22 0.75 428
Edebtpc 5.90 1.31 0.63 5.04 5.97 6.89 8.50 604
Gdppc 6.77 1.09 3.80 5.80 6.79 7.59 9.06 626
Liec 4.72 1.99 1.00 3.00 4.80 7.00 7.00 601
Polcon 0.17 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.86 660
Assass 0.27 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 7.40 658
Purges 0.08 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.60 65822
Data source
Variable Description Source
Extdebtpc Log total long term external
debt per capita, constant USD
WDI
Gdppc Log gdp pro capite, constant
USD, beginning of period
WDI
Excharr De facto exchange rate classi-
¯cation
Reinhart and Rogo® (2004)
Findepth Domestic credit to the bank-
ing sector as pct of GDP
WDI
Open Export over GDP, beginning
of period
WDI
Educ Average years of secondary
schooling
Barro and Lee (2000)
Aidpc Aid per capita WDI
Conc Share of concessional debt on
total long term external debt
WDI
Din°a Dummy for high in°ation
countries (> 40%)
WDI
Herfgov Her¯ndal Index for govern-
ment
DPI
Polcon Political constraint index Witold Henisz
Liec Legislative index of electoral
competitiveness
DPI
Assass Assassinations CNTS archive
Purges Purges CNTS archive